Processing of novel food reveals payoff and rank-biased social learning in a wild primate.

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18 mai 2021

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1038/s41598-021-88857-6

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/pmid/34006940

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/2045-2322

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/urn/urn:nbn:ch:serval-BIB_0F65F8AEEAB76

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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess , CC BY 4.0 , https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/



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C. Canteloup et al., « Processing of novel food reveals payoff and rank-biased social learning in a wild primate. », Serveur académique Lausannois, ID : 10.1038/s41598-021-88857-6


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Social learning-learning from others-is the basis for behavioural traditions. Different social learning strategies (SLS), where individuals biasedly learn behaviours based on their content or who demonstrates them, may increase an individual's fitness and generate behavioural traditions. While SLS have been mostly studied in isolation, their interaction and the interplay between individual and social learning is less understood. We performed a field-based open diffusion experiment in a wild primate. We provided two groups of vervet monkeys with a novel food, unshelled peanuts, and documented how three different peanut opening techniques spread within the groups. We analysed data using hierarchical Bayesian dynamic learning models that explore the integration of multiple SLS with individual learning. We (1) report evidence of social learning compared to strictly individual learning, (2) show that vervets preferentially socially learn the technique that yields the highest observed payoff and (3) also bias attention toward individuals of higher rank. This shows that behavioural preferences can arise when individuals integrate social information about the efficiency of a behaviour alongside cues related to the rank of a demonstrator. When these preferences converge to the same behaviour in a group, they may result in stable behavioural traditions.

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