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- doi: 10.2298/FID1302105R
- 0353-5738
openAccess , https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ , BY-NC-ND
Mots-clés
lie laž fikcija fiction lažnost falsity deception prevara intencionalni čin intentional act object objekat Kant, Imanuel Kant, Imanuel Meinong Majnong Sartr Sartre Derida, Žak Derrida, ŽakSujets proches
Legends and stories Novels Stories Novels Novellas (Short novels) Fiction--Philosophy Metafiction StoriesCiter ce document
Venanzio Raspa, « The Reality of Lies », Repository of Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University in Belgrade, ID : 10.2298/FID1302105R
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A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a (phenomenological) context. But there is more: it identifies a (dialectical) context.