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2002
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Mots-clés
change orders ; incentive contracts ; fixed-price contracts décision publique ; économie expérimentale ; théorie de l’évaluation des actifs financiers ; consentements à payerSujets proches
Cambistry International exchange Exchange, Foreign Foreign exchange problem Foreign currency Currency exchange FX (Finance) Foreign money Forex Cambio extranjero Cambio internacional Cambio monetario Divisas Mercado de divisas Moneda--Cambio exterior Devises (monnaie) Cambisme Importations de capitaux Change international Change étranger Exportations de capitauxCiter ce document
Robert Kast et al., « Calcul économique et incertitude socio-politique : une procédure d’évaluation des projets publics », Économie & prévision, ID : 10.3406/ecop.2002.6883
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Résumé
Public Contract Bidding : Fixed-Price Contracts Amended by Change Orders or Incentive Contracts ? French procurement contracts are usually awarded by fixed-price contracts. However, fixed prices can be raised by change orders that occur after the contract is signed. The authors develop a model of this procedure that gives an explanation for low-ball bidding strategies and cost overruns. Then the authors show that this procedure can yield an expected price lower than the optimal linear incentive contract of McAfee and McMillan (1986).