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2019
- handle: 10670/1.1wt55j
- halshs: halshs-01763003
- doi: 10.1093/jeea/jvy030
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvy030
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Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Social inequality Social equality Inequality Egalitarianism Bargaining Labor negotiationsCiter ce document
Fabio Galeotti et al., « Efficiency versus Equality in Bargaining », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1093/jeea/jvy030
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Résumé
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.