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- handle: 10670/1.3cd760
- hal: hal-03263856
- doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007
- WOS: 000433415100002
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Internet Neutrality Net-neutrality Screening Zero-rating L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of Regulation L - Industrial Organization/L.L8 - Industry Studies: Services/L.L8.L86 - Information and Internet Services • Computer Software D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
DARPA Internet Internet (Computer network) Price policy, Industrial Retail pricing Price policy Technical drawing Engineering drawing Mathematical drawing Industrial drawing Plans Drafting, Mechanical Plans Mathematical drawing Plans Drawing, Architectural PlansCiter ce document
Bruno Jullien et al., « Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007
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Résumé
We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).