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- handle: 10670/1.4xi81s
- hal: hal-03167101
- doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656
- WOS: 000573442600006
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Cross-group externalities Collusion Two-sided markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market ImperfectionSujets proches
Blanks (Forms) Forms, blanks, etc Blank forms Flawedness Defectiveness Commercial products--Prices Commodity prices Price theory Justum pretium Price policy, Industrial Retail pricing Price policy Public markets Industrial economics Market structure Funds Funding Injuries (Law) Measure of damages Damages--Law and legislation Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Yassine Lefouili et al., « Collusion between two-sided platforms », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102656
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Résumé
We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.