Drug Courts and the “responsibility without blame” approach

Résumé En

This paper starts from a paradox and aims to solve it. On the one hand, although Drug Courts (DCs) are one of the most interesting penal innovations in recent years, running counter to the dominant retributive approach and the rival approach based on deterrence, they have surprisingly not attracted the attention of philosophers and therefore lack a solid philosophical foundation. On the other hand, although Pickard’s “responsibility without blame” approach looks very convincing on paper, its practical applications remain unclear outside the clinical context. I argue that Pickard’s approach is the theoretical framework that DCs need and that they are a compelling application of it: DCs do ascribe to participants various forms of responsibility (criminal “liability-responsibility”, responsibility of choice, responsibility for progress or failure, responsibility as answerability, tort liability) while striving to keep “affective blame” at bay in order to help them regain their autonomy. However, I argue that some of the limitations of both this approach and DCs become apparent once we consider the “outer limits” of DCs, in other words those who are terminated from DCs and those who refuse to enter DCs in the first place.