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2020
- handle: 10670/1.8tzlcd
- hal: hal-04428224
- doi: 10.1353/hph.2020.0003
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1353/hph.2020.0003
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Dominique Demange et al., « Physical Action, Species, and Matter: The Debate between Roger Bacon and Peter John Olivi », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10.1353/hph.2020.0003
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Résumé
In QQ.23–31 of Olivi’s Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum (SummaII) and in Bacon’s De multiplicatione specierum (DMS) 1.3, we find an intriguing discussionconcerning the link between agent and patient in accounts of physical action inthe Aristotelian tradition. Both thinkers hold that species were the link between agentand patient; they disagree, however, about the definition and function of species.The dispute leads the two thinkers to develop and clarify their accounts of physicalaction. They discuss temporality, secondary causality, active potentiality, and thedistinction between virtual and substantial contact. This paper provides an accountof Olivi’s theory of species in medio and clarifies how it differs from Bacon’s theory.It throws a spotlight on a significant episode in the history of philosophy, in whichAristotelian concepts were found unsuitable to account for action at a distance andin the interior of the patient, and hence new concepts of virtual action and specieshad to be devised.