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23 mai 2013
- handle: 10670/1.91jshx
- hal: hal-00825297
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Performance measurement Manipulation Controllability principle Excuse culture Influence activity D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M4 - Accounting and Auditing/M.M4.M41 - Accounting M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics/M.M5.M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their EffectsSujets proches
Competence Commerce--Accounting Finance--Accounting Commercial accounting Business enterprises--Accounting Financial accounting AccountancyCiter ce document
François Larmande et al., « Fishing for excuses and performance evaluation », HAL-SHS : droit et gestion, ID : 10670/1.91jshx
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Résumé
We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a convincing case requires time, time that is not spent on exerting productive eff ort, and thus generating information represents an opportunity cost. We obtain necessary and suffi cient conditions for the principal to prefer a policy of adjusting ex post the performance measure for the information provided by the agent to a policy of conforming to a result-based system with no adjustments. The risk aversion and a possible limited liability of the agent play an important role in the analysis. This paper clarifi es the issues asso- ciated with the so-called \excuse culture" prevailing in some organizations.