Limited Commitment, Social Control and Risk-Sharing Coalitions in Village Economies

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2023

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.2139/ssrn.4408595

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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess




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Fernando Jaramillo et al., « Limited Commitment, Social Control and Risk-Sharing Coalitions in Village Economies », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.2139/ssrn.4408595


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The need to insure against idiosyncratic income risk leads to the formation of risksharing groups in village economies where formal financial markets are absent. We develop a theoretical model to address the impact of limited commitment and social control on the extent of informal risk sharing when agents are induced to form such risk-sharing coalitions. Social control increases the prospect of future punishment of present defectors and thus mitigates the absence of commitment. A defection-proof core-partition exists, is unique and homophilic. Riskier societies may not be more segmented and may not pay a higher cost for insurance. A higher social control leads to a less segmented society but does not necessarily lead to a lower price for sharing risk. We provide evidence, based on data on Thai villages, that consumption smoothing conforms with our theoretical result of homophily-based coalitions and that social control contributes to a lesser segmentation of a society.

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