Efficiency and Acceptability of Climate Policies: Race Against the Lock-ins

Fiche du document

Date

2013

Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Relations

Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.7711/feemre3.2013.11.002

Collection

Archives ouvertes

Licence

info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess




Citer ce document

Julie Rozenberg et al., « Efficiency and Acceptability of Climate Policies: Race Against the Lock-ins », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.7711/feemre3.2013.11.002


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé 0

Policymakers have good reasons to prefer capital-based policies - such as CAFE standards or feebates programs - over a carbon price. A carbon price minimizes the discounted cost of a climate policy, but may result in existing capital being under-utilized or scrapped before its scheduled lifetime, hurt the workers that depend on it, and inflict an immediate income drop. Capital-based policies avoid these obstacles, but can reach a given climate target only if implemented early enough. Delaying mitigation policies may thus create a political-economy lock-in (easier-to-implement policies become unavailable) in addition to the economic lock-in (the target becomes more expensive).

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en