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- handle: 10670/1.caqoon
- halshs: halshs-03038871
- doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103818
- WOS: 000512481400011
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103818
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Environmental protection policies Markov perfect equilibrium Spatial harvesting problems Differential games R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics/R.R1 - General Regional Economics/R.R1.R12 - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C61 - Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q23 - Forestry C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q28 - Government PolicySujets proches
Crops--HarvestingCiter ce document
Giorgio Fabbri et al., « Policy effectiveness in spatial resource wars: A two-region model », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103818
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Résumé
We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents/players strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-region setup. To counteract the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when players are free to choose where to fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the equilibria in the case of a common resource with those that emerge when the regulator either creates a natural reserve, or assigns Territorial User Rights to the players. We show that, when the discount rate is close to its "critical value", i.e. when technological and preference parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity/effort, the policies are ineffective in promoting the conservation of the resource and, in addition, they lead to a lower payoff for at least one of the players. Conversely, in a context of harsher harvesting intensity, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing extinction while also improving the welfare of both players.