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- handle: 10670/1.cj85a7
- halshs: halshs-00754118
- doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x
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Communication, Primitive Mass communicationCiter ce document
Olivier Gossner et al., « Optimal use of communication resources », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x
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Résumé
We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.