Fiche du document
2021
- handle: 10670/1.cur3q4
- halshs: halshs-02973786
- doi: 10.1007/s00199-020-01291-z
- WOS: 000545202400001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00199-020-01291-z
Mots-clés
Heterogeneities Hyperbolic discounting Markovian strategies Collective choice E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles/E.E3.E32 - Business Fluctuations • Cycles E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook/E.E6.E62 - Fiscal PolicySujets proches
Hours (Time) Choice, Social Public choice Collective choice Trade Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy)Citer ce document
Jean-Pierre Drugeon et al., « On Markovian collective choice with heterogeneous quasi-hyperbolic discounting », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s00199-020-01291-z
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Résumé
A general setup is considered where quasi-hyperbolic discounting agents differ in assuming heterogeneous bias for the present as well as heterogeneous discounting parameters, consumptions being, moreover, subject to a standard feasibility constraint. A collective utility function is defined as a linear combination of the inter-temporal utilities of the selves of the different agents, the elementary unit being thus the self of a given period of a given agent. Such a framework generating a tension between Pareto-optimality and time consistency for the optimal allocations, a new approach is introduced in order to tackle this issue. This builds from an a priori time-inconsistent collective utility function where the benevolent planner is to be apprehended in terms of a sequence of successive incarnations, any of these incarnations being endowed with its own objective. The associated optimal policy is the equilibrium of a game between the successive incarnations of the planner when the players follow Markovian strategies. This is compared with a more standard approach where restrictions would be imposed on the collective utility function that ensure the time consistency of the optimal decisions.