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2016
- handle: 10670/1.fkvsdt
- hal: hal-01307683
- doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.01.006
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.01.006
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Time-consistent policy rules Heterogeneous discounting programs E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles/E.E3.E32 - Business Fluctuations • Cycles O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity/O.O4.O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth ModelsSujets proches
Factors Agents, Manufacturers' Manufacturers' representatives Bank discount Discount rate Factors Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy)Citer ce document
Jean-Pierre Drugeon et al., « On time-consistent policy rules for heterogeneous discounting programs », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.01.006
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Résumé
This article considers a new concept of social optimum for an economy populated by agents with heterogeneous discount factors. It is based upon an approach that constrains decision rules to be temporally consistent: these are stationary and unequivocally ruled by the state variable. For agents who differ only in their discount factors and have equal weights in the planner’s objective, the temporally-consistent optimal solution produces identical consumption for the agents at all time periods. In the long run, the capital stock is determined by a modified golden rule that corresponds to an average-like summation of all discount factors. The general argument is illustrated by various two-agent examples that allow for an explicit determination of the temporally consistent decision rules. Interestingly, this temporally consistent solution can be simply recovered from the characterization of a social planner’s problem with variable discounting and can also be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium through the use of various instruments.