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1 novembre 2021
- handle: 10670/1.h83aet
- ijn_03498609
- doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02930-7
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11229-020-02930-7
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Mots-clés
Perception-like/Sensory imagination Belief-like/Cognitive imagination Conceptual content Non-conceptual content Observational conceptsSujets proches
Mental imagery Mental images Imagery, Mental Images, MentalCiter ce document
Margherita Arcangeli, « The conceptual nature of imaginative content », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10.1007/s11229-020-02930-7
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Résumé
Imagination is widely thought to come in two varieties: perception-like and belief-like imagination. What precisely sets them apart, however, is not settled. More needs to be said about the features that make one variety perception-like and the other belief-like. One common, although typically implicit, view is that they mimic their counterparts (perception and belief, respectively) along the conceptuality dimension: while the content of belief-like imagination is fully conceptual, the content of perception-like imagination is fully (or at least partially) non-conceptual. Such a view, however, is not sufficiently motivated in the literature. I will show that there are good reasons to reject it and I will argue that both varieties of imagination involve fully conceptual contents (independently of whether either perception or belief has non-conceptual content). I will suggest an alternative way to draw the distinction between perception-like and belief-like imagination along the conceptuality dimension, according to which only perception-like imagination requires observational concepts.