The basic approval voting game

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2010

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HAL-SHS : sciences politiques

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Archives ouvertes

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Centre pour la communication scientifique directe

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info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess

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Polls Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) Balance

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Remzi Sanver et al., « The basic approval voting game », HAL-SHS : sciences politiques, ID : 10670/1.hn262v

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We survey results about Approval Voting obtained within the standard framework of game theory. Restricting the set of strategies to undominated and sincere ballots does not help to predict Approval Voting outcomes, which is also the case under strategic equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium and its usual refinements. Strong Nash equilibrium in general does not exist but predicts the election of a Condorcet winner when one exists.

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