Fiche du document
- handle: 10670/1.j99g15
- halshs: halshs-00754449
- doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.011
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.011
Mots-clés
Bayesian games Asymmetric information Value of information C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • UnawarenessSujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's gamesCiter ce document
Olivier Gossner, « Ability and Knowledge », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.011
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
In games with incomplete information, more information to a player implies a broader strategy set for this player in the normal form game, hence more knowledge implies more ability. We prove that, conversely, given two normal form games G and G′ such that players in a subset J of the set of players possess more strategies in G′ than in G, there exist two games with incomplete information with normal forms G and G′ such that players in J are more informed in the second than in the first. More ability can then be rationalized by more knowledge, and our result thus establishes the formal equivalence between ability and knowledge.