1 avril 2015
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Guillaume Plantin et al., « Destabilizing carry trades », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10670/1.kf60wj
We offer a model of currency carry trades in which carry traders generate self-sustained excess returns if they coordinate on supplying excessive capital to a target economy. The interest-rate differential between their funding currency and the target currency is their coordination device. Such self-fulfilling pro table currency trades arise when the central bank of the target economy ignores the impact of carry-trade in flows on domestic asset prices, and responds only to their effect on inflation. We solve for a unique equilibrium that exhibits the classic pattern of the carry-trade recipient currency appreciating for extended periods, punctuated by sharp falls.