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- handle: 10670/1.l1bn4o
- hal: hal-02517255
- doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010
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Approval voting Efficiency Evaluationwise strategy-proofness Preference-approval Strategy-proofnessSujets proches
Polls Social science Sciences, Social Human sciences Social studies Behavioral sciences Class distinction Rank Classes, Social Natural science Sciences Science of science Paws Hands Paw Funds Funding Decision-making, Group Collective decision making Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Bora Erdamar et al., « Evaluationwise strategy-proofness », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010
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Résumé
We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as “acceptable” or “unacceptable”. In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of strategy-proofness, called evaluationwise strategy-proofness, where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Evaluationwise strategy-proofness is weaker than strategy-proofness. However, we establish the prevalence of a logical incompatibility between evaluationwise strategy-proofness, anonymity and efficiency. On the other hand, we show possibility results when either anonymity or efficiency is weakened.