The Ruling of the General Court in Intel: Towards the End of an Effect-based Approach in European Competition Law?
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- handle: 10670/1.lw6kdt
- hal: hal-01511174
- doi: 10.1093/jeclap/lpu088
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/jeclap/lpu088
Mots-clés
Protection des consommateurs Engagement d'exclusivité Mécanisme d'amélioration de la fidélité Entreprises dominantesSujets proches
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Paul Nihoul, « The Ruling of the General Court in Intel: Towards the End of an Effect-based Approach in European Competition Law? », HAL-SHS : droit et gestion, ID : 10.1093/jeclap/lpu088
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Résumé
In Intel, the General Court confirms the jurisprudence considering as inherently illegal the provision of financial advantages by dominant firms in exchange for exclusivity commitments, as part of a fidelity-enhancing mechanism or in exchange for a commitment to restrict the sale of competing products.This ruling casts doubt on the viability of the idea, central in the Guidance Paper on Article 102 TFEU, that in order to bring an action against dominant companies, it is necessary to establish with the assistance of specific economic models the existence of a concrete, negative harm caused to consumers.