The EU, Russia and Ukraine: a double track with no end?

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In March 2014, Russia took over the Crimean Peninsula by stealth.Having annexed it on 18 March, Russia made further forays inthe eastern part of Ukraine, principally in Donetsk and Luhansk,where it provided secessionists with manpower and know-how,weapons (including heavy weapons), information technology andpropaganda, as well as political support. Discarding the idea thatterritory or history alone can explain Russia’s grab, we assumethat, besides increases in gas prices and demands for changes inthe constitution while stoking unrest and violating borders, theKremlin has resorted to war in eastern Ukraine as a means to exertpressure on the Kyiv government. What matters for Moscowis probably to prevent democracy from taking root in Ukraine, orin Western Ukraine for that matter. To the Kremlin, a failed statewould be preferable to a democratic state, divided or not.If this interpretation is correct, to what extent can the conflictbe resolved? Must the interests claimed by the Kremlin be takeninto account in order to bring peace in Ukraine and reset EU–Russia relations? What can the EU – and the West otherwise, i.e.the United States – do?This Policy Brief argues that a solution to the conflict is beyondreach, because the conflict concerns two opposing worlds. If thewar is eventually a means for Vladimir Putin to stifle democracyin Ukraine and to strengthen his hold over Russia, there is noroom for compromise. The history of EU–Russia relations andthe structure that has characterized them since the demise ofthe USSR underline the how difficult it is for the EU to maintain,or indeed establish, a balanced relationship with an increasinglyauthoritarian and predatory regime based on one-man rule.The EU may have inadvertently played into the hand of the Kremlin– through lack of imagination and strategy, rather than contemptfor a wounded power, as Putin has contended. Since theoutbreak of the crisis in 2014, however, the EU has mustered thecapacity to target sanctions at Russian individuals that bear responsibilityfor the war in Ukraine, and at specific sectors crucialto the Russian economy, all the while attempting to pursue politicaldialogue with the authorities – a ‘double-track approach’.But we must ask: What is the purpose of sanctions that do notbring about changes in the opponent’s political behaviour? orof a dialogue that does not lead to a solution? And is there anythingthat the EU and its member states can do?