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8 novembre 2023
- handle: 10670/1.nxnojf
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emotions truth values Alexius Meinong Ronald de SousaCiter ce document
Venanzio Raspa, « On Emotional Truth », Phenomenology and Mind, ID : 10670/1.nxnojf
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Truth is not only a semantic notion, because it can involve our whole being, both intellectual and emotional. The emotional character of the truth determines its relevance for us. In this paper I will first discuss Ronald de Sousa’s theory of emotional truth and the idea of the appropriateness of emotions in relation to judgment. Secondly, I will deal with Meinong’s conception that emotions have both an evaluative and a cognitive character, allow us to know what the world is like, and consequently are related to truth. Truth then turns out to be a value. If something is valuable to me, it stirs an emotion. That is why truth is capable of attracting feelings. Emotional truth is that truth which attracts a justified knowledge-feeling. This is the basis on which we might develop an aesthetics of concepts whereby theories, in order to be established, need not only to be regarded as true but to produce an emotional involvement of the subjects.