Fiche du document
2016
- handle: 10670/1.om4qog
- halshs: halshs-01141326
- doi: 10.1007/s11115-015-0304-4
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11115-015-0304-4
Mots-clés
coalition game theory power games Managerial innovationSujets proches
Health care delivery Health services Personal health services Medical services Medical and health care industry Delivery of medical care Health care Healthcare Delivery of health careCiter ce document
Gulliver Lux et al., « Coalitions of Actors and Managerial Innovations in the Healthcare and Social Healthcare Sector », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s11115-015-0304-4
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
This paper studies the behavior of a variety of stakeholders around the adoption of managerial innovations desired by operational managers of health services institutions. We show that if the operational manager may cause the managerial innovation, the tool prospective is subject to power games around coalitions of actors. The study of several management situations in health services institutions enables us, using the game theory, to highlight the “winning”, “losing” and “uncertain” coalitions that can achieve operational management within the establishment to settle a managerial innovation.