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1 janvier 2017
- handle: 10670/1.p0793v
- hal: hal-01451382
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Experiment Discrimination Gender Differences Real Effort C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor/J.J2.J24 - Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J7 - Labor Discrimination/J.J7.J70 - General -fin]/Statistical Finance [q-fin.ST]Citer ce document
Emmanuel Peterle et al., « Gender Differences in Competitive Positions: Experimental Evidence on Job Promotion », HAL-SHS : études de genres, ID : 10670/1.p0793v
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Résumé
This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly recruits. Discriminatory behavior by the employer is isolated in a treatment where workers cannot send signals. We find that gender disparity among promoted workers is highest when workers can apply for promotion and employers recruit. Strikingly, the gender composition in competitive position is balanced in the absence of a signaling institution. When signaling is possible, we observe that female workers who do not request a promotion arediscriminated against.