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- handle: 10670/1.t0qjpn
- hal: hal-02929306
- doi: 10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3
- PUBMED: 32837395
- WOS: 000551038900001
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François Salanié et al., « Public and private incentives for self-protection », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3
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Résumé
Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protectionmeasures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, moreself-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house moreoften. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsettingeffect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection isincreased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We showhow to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred)by a social planner.