Image Schemas as Epistemic Feelings: The Shift from Cognitive to Affective Semantics

Résumé 0

The present article aims to revisit the concept of image schemas, as it has been traditionally defined in cognitive semantics, in light of the notion of epistemic feeling. I advocate the view that epistemic feelings-that is, affective states that express a definite form of cognizanceare good candidates for psychologically underpinning image-schematic structures and explaining the semantic processes in which they are involved, and I call for a paradigmatic shift from a "cognitive" to an "affective"-or, more exactly, "psychoaffective"-approach to linguistic meaning. After briefly presenting the notion of (psycho)affective semantics, I examine successively: (a) the idea that both image schemas and epistemic feelings are subjective and ubiquitous properties of the mind; (b) the experiential commonalities between image schemas and epistemic feelings as semantic factors (abstractness, typicality, epistemic immediacy, polar opposition); (c) the idea that epistemic feelings may be a unique means of psychologically grounding image schemas; (d) five significant types of epistemic feelings that may be involved in the making of image-schematic structures. The article proposes a new theoretical/epistemological perspective on image schemas and semantics, at the interface between linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and affective science.