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2022
- handle: 10670/1.xz7d9e
- hal: hal-03791673
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Duties Fee system (Taxation) Taxation, Incidence of Tax reform Tax policy Taxes Environmental pollution Chemical pollution Pollution--Control Contamination of environment Molding (Clay, plaster, etc.) Clay modeling Modelling Public markets Funds Funding Pattern Model Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Ludovic A. Julien et al., « Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.xz7d9e
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We introduce polluting emissions in a sequential noncooperative oligopoly model of bilateral exchange. In one sector a leader and a follower use polluting technologies which create negative externalities on the payoffs of strategic traders who belong to the other sector. By modeling emissions as a negative externality, we show that the leader pollutes more (less) than the follower when strategies are substitutes (complements). Then, we consider the implementation of public policies to control the levels of emissions, namely two taxation mechanisms and a permit market. We study the effects of these public policies. Moreover, we determine the conditions under which these public policies can implement a Pareto-improving allocation.