Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice: Evidence from Chess Players

Fiche du document

Date

2 février 2024

Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Collection

Archives ouvertes

Licences

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess




Citer ce document

Elias Bouacida et al., « Decreasing Differences in Expert Advice: Evidence from Chess Players », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.z5x9py


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé 0

We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chess players. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past games and allowed them to revise their evaluation following advice from a high or a low ability player. While our data confirms the theoretical prediction that high-quality advice has the potential to act as a ``great equalizer,'' reducing the difference between high and low ability players, this is not what happens in practice. This is in part because our subjects ignore too much of the advice they receive, but also because low ability players pay -- either due to overconfidence or intrinsic preference -- a higher premium than high ability ones by following their initial idea instead of high-quality advice.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en