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1 août 2022
- handle: 10670/1.zeskpz
- hal: hal-04000868
- doi: 10.1257/pol.20200272
- WOS: WOS:000972035700012
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/pol.20200272
Mots-clés
D - Microeconomics/D.D3 - Distribution/D.D3.D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H21 - Efficiency • Optimal Taxation H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies K - Law and Economics/K.K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law/K.K3.K34 - Tax LawSujets proches
Duties Fee system (Taxation) Taxation, Incidence of Tax reform Tax policy TaxesCiter ce document
Laurent Simula et al., « Gini and Optimal Income Taxation by Rank », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1257/pol.20200272
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Résumé
We solve the nonlinear income tax program for rank-dependent social welfare functions, expressing the trade-off between size and inequality using the Gini and related families of positional indices. Absent bunching, ranks in the actual and optimal allocations are invariant. Exploiting this feature, we provide new, simple, and intuitive tax formulas for both the quasilinear and additive cases and new comparative static results. Our approach makes insights from optimal taxation more widely accessible. In some of our simulations the actual US tax policy is close to being optimal—except at the top, where optimal rates are much higher than in actuality.