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- handle: 10670/1.znlfh1
- halshs: halshs-02973406
- doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.001
- WOS: 000528252000002
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.001
Mots-clés
Farsighted stable sets Heterogeneous expectations One-to-one matching Voting Effectivity functions C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C71 - Cooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D74 - Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • RevolutionsSujets proches
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Francis Bloch et al., « Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.001
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Résumé
This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as unique stationary points of the expectation function of some agent. We characterize stable alternatives in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states that can be supported as farsightedly stable.