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- handle: 10670/1.ztf6uj
- hal: hal-02511782
- doi: 10.1007/s40821-020-00151-z
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s40821-020-00151-z
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Mots-clés
Entrepreneurship Institutions Corruption Mediation Indonesia D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration/M.M1.M13 - New Firms • Startups L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior/L.L2.L26 - EntrepreneurshipSujets proches
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Julien Hanoteau et al., « Institutional quality, conforming and evasive entrepreneurship », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s40821-020-00151-z
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Résumé
In this article, we unpack Baumol’s (J Polit Econ 98(5):893–921, 1990) theory of entrepreneurship’s outcomes (productive, unproductive, and destructive) in a framework of failing institutions, considering that entrepreneurship is instead first characterized by two non-mutually exclusive types of behavior (conforming versus evasive). We hypothesize that the evasive activity (firm-level corruption) is undertaken as a second-best response to poor institutional quality, supporting the conforming activity. Using instrumental variable panel regression in the context of Indonesia, we evidence the mediating effect of bribing on the relation between local institutional quality and new business density, thus unveiling the real effect of institutional quality on entrepreneurship.