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26 février 2021
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- 2102.13562
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Economics - Theoretical EconomicsSujets proches
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Alp Atakan et al., « Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk », arXiv - économie
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We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that the decision-maker's ability to cross-verify the experts' advice acts as a commitment device for the experts. We prove the existence of an equilibrium, where an expert's equilibrium payoff is equal to what he would obtain if he could commit to truthfully revealing his information.