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4 août 2023
- 2308.02274
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Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Computer Science - Social and Information Networks Economics - Theoretical EconomicsCiter ce document
Robert P. Gilles et al., « Game theoretic foundations of the Gately power measure for directed networks », arXiv - économie
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Résumé
We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players--constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution of a hierarchical network can be represented through a TU-game. We investigate the properties of this TU-representation and investigate the Gately value of the TU-representation resulting in the Gately power measure. We establish when the Gately measure is a Core power gauge, investigate the relationship of the Gately with the $\beta$-measure, and construct an axiomatisation of the Gately measure.