In a recent article, David Miller has criticised Thomas Bradwardine's theory of truth and signification and my defence of Bradwardine's application of it to the semantic paradoxes. Much of Miller's criticism is sympathetic and helpful in gaining a better understanding of the relationship between Bra...

The liar and the new t-schema

Articles

Stephen Read (1 déc. 2010)

Articles

Since Tarski published his study of the concept of truth in the 1930s, it has been orthodox practice to suppose that every instance of the T-schema is true. However, some instances of the schema are false. These include the paradoxical instances exemplified by the Liar sentence. It is shown that a b...

Leacock and Understanding Canada

Livres et chapitres d'ouvrages

Guy Vanderhaeghe (27 sept. 2017)

Livres et chapitres d'ouvrages

This essay should begin with an explanation. I came to read Stephen Leacock late, beyond the bounds of a university, and thus without benefit of supervision. Therefore, whatever I write cannot be attributed to bad teaching. Nor can I pretend to be familiar with more than nine or ten of his books. As...

Do we need to reform the old t-scheme?

Articles

Jan Wolenski (1 juin 2012)

Articles

This paper critically comments Stephen Read's analysis of the T-scheme offered in his paper: "The Liar and the new T-scheme". I argue that Read misinterprets Tarski in some points and that the A-scheme introduced in Read's paper is either reducible to the old (Tarskian) T-scheme or raises essential...

Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox

Livres et chapitres d'ouvrages

Shahid Rahman et al. (1 oct. 2008)

Livres et chapitres d'ouvrages

The Liar Paradox challenges logicians’ and semanticists’ theories of truth and meaning. Modern accounts of paradoxes in formal semantics offer solutions through the hierarchy of object language and metalanguage. Yet this solution to the Liar presupposes that sentences have unique meaning. This assum...