6 avril 2021
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/0035-6212
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2421-5864
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Ivan Mosca, « Le regole del gioco. Perché la realtà sociale non è un sistema normativo. », Rivista di estetica, ID : 10.4000/estetica.1816
Why the social ontology uses the game as paradigmatic example of social object? Is social reality a game? In this short essay, shared characteristics and differences of ludic and social acts are explored to explode the myth of the normative structure of social reality. In order to explain and demonstrate their theories, major authors of our research sector as Searle and Smith appeal to ludic phenomenons as unmistakable evidences of regulated social activities. Nevertheless well valued theorists don’t recognize that there are tens of different typologies of games, about which it should be appropriate to draw up a regional ontology, as much there are tons of rule types, not always prescriptive and not always descriptive. The instant article demonstrates that social reality is not explainable by appealing to regulated behaviors, opening in this way a research context that involves the Interactive Fiction of play. Therefore the ludic phenomenon rests the base of social reality, however disconnecting it from the concept of rule, which too much influenced the research on mind, language and culture.