Theory of Legal Interpretation and Contextualism

Résumé En Sl

In this essay I will attempt to answer the critical observations made by Kristan, Poggi and Vignolo of my theory of legal interpretation. I express the opinion that, apart from some gaps and defects to be addressed, my theory can satisfactorily overcome this criticism. In answering these observations, I again stress the fruitfulness of moderate contextualism as a semantical point of reference for legal interpretation, also striving to deepen the notion of “background context”, and to clarify the differences among four types of interpretative disagreements. I also maintain that the most important and problematic issues in interpretative legal practices today are those which express, as in bioethics, profound intensional divergences.

Avtor na tem mestu odgovarja na kritične pomisli, ki jih imajo v zvezi z njegovim naukom o pravnem razlaganju Kristan, Poggijeva in Vignolo. Meni, da lahko njegov nauk po dopolnitvi in odpravi nekaterih pomanjkljivosti uspešno premaga vse težave, ki jih izpostavljajo. Z odgovorom na njihova opazovanja ponovno poudari, da je v nauku o razlaganju v pravu koristno prevzeti zmerno kontekstualistični nauk o pomenu. Dodatno poskusi razčleniti »globinski kontekst« in pojasniti razlike med štirimi oblikami razlagalnih nesoglasij. Kot danes najpomembnejša in najtežavnejša vprašanja v zvezi z razlagalnimi praksami v pravu pa vidi tista vprašanja, ob katerih se – npr. v bioetiki – pokažejo globoke razlike med pravnim določilom pripisanimi intencionalnimi pomeni.