Against the conversational model of legal interpretation

Résumé En Sl

The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice’s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-called legislative intent is not able to play the role that speaker’s intention plays in ordinary understanding and the Gricean thesis.

Zoper pogovorni model pravnega razlaganja. O razliki med zakonodajnim in govorčevim namenom. Avtorica kritizira trditev t. im. pogovornega modela, po kateri se pravno razlaganje bistveno ne razlikuje od običajnega razumevanja. Skladno s tem modelom gre namreč v obeh primerih za postopek sklepanja, kakršnega je Paul Grice opisoval s svojim naukom o pogovornih implikacijah. Cilj te razprave je dokazati nasprotno, in sicer da t. im. zakonodajni namen ne more igrati enake vloge, kot jo ima namen govorca v običajnem razumevanju.