Arato’s Adventures: between sovereignty and constituent power

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9 octobre 2020

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Ce document est lié à :
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Joel Colón-Ríos, « Arato’s Adventures: between sovereignty and constituent power », Revus, ID : 10.4000/revus.6257


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In this paper, I will argue that the paradigm of sovereign constitution-making, as described by Professor Arato, is inconsistent with the very notion of the constituent power of the people. What the distinction between the sovereign and the post-sovereign constitution-making models do is to bring to the surface an unfortunate misunderstanding long present in our constitutional traditions. The exercise of constituent power, as I will show in Part 1 below, should have always been non-sovereign if understood as a power that can only belong to the populace. In Part 2, that argument is developed further but, rather than challenging the result of Professor Arato’s fine theoretical and comparative analysis, I propose an alternative route towards the same conclusion. The advantage of this approach, it will be seen in Part 3 and 4, is that it avoids the democratic trade-offs that usually accompany the post-sovereign model, such as the creation of interim constitutions by non-elected entities. This alternative route, however, is inconsistent with the way in which the power of constituent assemblies has been understood in many 20th and 21st century constitution-making episodes.

Aratove Adventures. Med suverenostjo in ustavodajno oblastjo. Avtor v tem prispevku trdi, da je paradigma suverenega ustavotvorja – tako kot jo predstavi Arato – neskladna s samim pojmom ustavodajne oblasti ljudstva. Razlikovanje med suverenim in post-suverenim modelom ustavotvorja izpostavi že dolgo prisoten nesporazum v naših ustavnih tradicijah. V prvem delu avtor pokaže, kako bi moralo izvrševanje ustavodajne oblasti vedno biti ne-suvereno, če to razumemo kot oblast, ki lahko pripada zgolj ljudem. V drugem delu nadalje razvije ta argument. Namesto da bi izpodbijal rezultate Aratove teoretične in primerjalne analize, avtor predstavi alternativno pot do istega zaključka. Kot pokaže v tretjem in četrtem delu članka, je prednost tega pristopa, da se izogne demokratičnim kompromisom – kot je npr. ustvarjanje začasnih ustav s strani neizvoljenih entitet – ki navadno spremljajo post-suvereni model. Po drugi strani pa je ta alternativa neskladna z načinom razumevanja oblasti ustavodajnih skupščin v mnogih ustavotvornih epizodah 20. in 21. stoletja.

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