2000
This document is linked to :
Relations industrielles ; vol. 55 no. 2 (2000)
Tous droits réservés © Département des relations industrielles de l'Université Laval, 2000
Jean-Guy Bergeron et al., « Les formes de représentation collective désirées par les salariés des services privés au Québec », Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, ID : 10.7202/051308ar
Unions in North America have had many problems organizing workers in the emerging private service sector. In this article, we explore the demand for collective representation in this sector as being a double probability of propensity to unionize and to be a member of a professional association. Using an accidental sample of 485 non-unionized workers in the private service sector of the Montreal Metropolitan Area, we find fhat 78% of these workers want some kind of collective representation. More precisely, 14% of the workers surveyed would like to join a union but not to be member of a professional association ; 28% would like to be a member of a professional association but not join a union ; finally, 36% of the workers would opt for both forms of collective representation. These results indicate a very significant demand for collective representation in the private service sector. This combined result far exceeds the simple demand for unions, which is the usual form of collective representation offered under Canadian labour law. To explain this combined demand for collective representation, we draw on a classical model of unionization to which we add variables related to the occupation or profession of workers in the private service sector, including the perceived importance of continued training for his or her occupation. It was hypothesized that the greater the importance of the perceived need for continued training, the more a worker will prefer a professional association as opposed to a union. Similarly, a worker who thinks that a specific pension plan and collective insurance should be available to all members of his or her occupation instead of only to workers of his or her employer are also likely to prefer a professional association rather than a union. The same hypothesis applies to the worker who thinks that there should be a placement service exclusively for his or her occupation.It was also hypothesized that a worker who attaches a high social value to his or her occupation would prefer to be a member of a professional association as opposed to a union member. Finally, workers who think that they have enough individual power in their occupation to negotiate with their employer would prefer no collective representation at all.Four logistic regressions were conducted : first, the propensity to unionize but not to be member of a professional association ; second, the desire to be member of a professional association but not to unionize ; third, the propensity both to unionize and to be a member of a professional association ; finally, the propensity neither to unionize nor to be a member of a professional association.The profile of private sector workers who would opt for a professional association as opposed to a union is as follows : the perception that their occupation enjoys a high social value, a higher level of education and increased age, a lower percentage of colleagues that would vote for a union, greater satisfaction with salary, the feeling that the law affords greater protection in case of being fired, the importance of continued training in the occupation, a lesser instrumentality attached to union membership. On the contrary, workers in the private service sector who prefer union membership as opposed to a professional association do not think that their occupation enjoys a high social value, are more likely to be women, have a lower level of education, be younger, have a lesser salary, and view unions as instrumental. The model is also efficient in predicting the joint probability of the propensity to be a member of a union and a professional association. The main determinants of this dual propensity are the percentage of colleagues that would vote for a union, union instrumentality, the perception of not being protected by the law in case of being fired, job dissatisfaction, the lack of individual negotiating power at work, a positive image of unions, being male and dissatisfied with salary. Finally, the determinants of wanting no collective representation at all are a high percentage of colleagues that would vote against a union, a negative union image, a negative perception of union instrumentality and the feeling of a strong individual negotiating power in the job.The results of the logistic regression on the desire to be member of a professional association to the exclusion of a union confirm the hypotheses about the perceived value of the occupation in society and the perceived importance of training to the occupation but do not confirm our hypotheses as regards pension plans, collective insurance and replacement services. As predicted, the perceived individual power to negotiate in one's occupation does predict the desire for no collective representation at all.In light of these results, a good union strategy to organize workers in the private service sector would be to take into account the possible combination of the determinants of the propensity to join a professional association but not a union with the determinants of an undifferentiated desire for representation by a union or a professional association. But there are many limitations to this analysis ; for example, women and younger workers and those with less education are more likely to join a union as opposed to a professional association. Since they are significant and growing groups of private service workers, unions must take them into account. At the same time, the union movement cannot ignores the importance of occupation to workers in the private service sector.