The impact of monitoring and sanctions on cheating: experimental evidence from Tunisia

Metadatas

Date

2016

type
Language
Identifiers


Cite this document

Insaf Bekir et al., « The impact of monitoring and sanctions on cheating: experimental evidence from Tunisia », Hyper Article en Ligne - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société, ID : 10.1002/mde.2731


Metrics


Share / Export

Abstract En

Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains.

From the same authors

On the same subjects

Within the same disciplines