DRUGS, VIOLENCE, AND STATE-SPONSORED PROTECTION RACKETS IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA

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1 juillet 2009

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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess



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Violent behavior

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Richard Snyder et al., « DRUGS, VIOLENCE, AND STATE-SPONSORED PROTECTION RACKETS IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA », Colombia Internacional, ID : 10670/1.58icf8


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Illegality does not necessarily breed violence. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may result from well-meaning policy reforms intended to reduce corruption and improve law enforcement, can lead to violence. The cases of drug trafficking in contemporary Mexico and Colombia show how a focus on the emergence and breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets helps explain variation in levels of violence both within and across illicit markets.

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