A water agency faced with quantity-quality management of a groundwater resource

Fiche du document

Auteurs
Date

2012

Discipline
Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Source

Archive Ouverte d'INRAE

Collection

Institut national de recherche pour l’agriculture, l’alimentation et l’environnement

Organisation

INRAE

Licence

info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess

Mots-clés En Fr

groundwater Stackelberg game constant policies quantity-quality management

Sujets proches En

Underground water Subterranean water Ground water Water, Underground

Citer ce document

Katrin Erdlenbruch et al., « A water agency faced with quantity-quality management of a groundwater resource », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10670/1.634oyz

Métriques

Partage / Export

Résumé En

We consider a problem of groundwater management in which a group of farmers over-exploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A Water Agency wishes to regulate the famer's activity, in order to reach a minimum quantity and quality level but it is subject to a budget constraint and cannot credibly commit to time-dependent optimal policies. We construct a Stackelberg game to determine a set of constant policies that brings the groundwater resource back to the desired state. We define a set of conditions for which constant policies exist and compute the amount of these instruments in an example.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en