Stakeholder Power in E-business Adoption with a Game Theory Perspective

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1 avril 2009

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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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Stakeholder relationships e-business adoption Stakeholder relationships e-business adoption Power relationships Game Theory Power relationships Game Theory e-Government


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Barbara Roberts, « Stakeholder Power in E-business Adoption with a Game Theory Perspective », Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, ID : 10670/1.9olgz9


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The likelihood that one organization can pressure the e-business adoption practices of other organizations depends on two conditions: there must be sufficient power difference between the organizations; and the e-business process benefit must be sensitive to the number of adopters. Given these two conditions, the powerful organization can use their power advantage to control adopter numbers through urging or suppressing adoption by others. Examples from practice are provided, a theoretical framework capturing the three dimensional nature of e-business adoption influence is developed, and Game Theory is used to explore the range of possible outcomes when pressure to adopt is brought to bear between organizations of unequal power.

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