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2023
- handle: 10670/1.eshfer
- halshs: halshs-03954188
- doi: 10.3982/TE5122
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3982/TE5122
Mots-clés
Network interdiction Networks Attack and defense Inspection games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of LawSujets proches
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Francis Bloch et al., « Attack and interception in networks », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.3982/TE5122
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Résumé
This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess’s paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibrium of a variant of the model: one where all nodes cooperate in interception.