Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement Using Resource-Based Evidence
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April 5, 2022
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.f0310f...
- hal: hal-03605609
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/6ufcm9944o8hnq3g4d3mbp13rc
HALSHS : archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société - notices sans texte intégral
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Keywords
Antitrust Enforcement Developing CountriesSimilar subjects
Underdeveloped countries Third World Emerging nations NICs (Newly industrialized countries) Fourth World Global South Underdeveloped areas Newly industrialized countries Least developed countries LDC's Less developed countries Newly industrializing countriesCite this document
Dina Waked, « Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement Using Resource-Based Evidence », HALSHS : archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société - notices sans texte intégral, ID : 10670/1.f0310f...
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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.
