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17 juillet 2020
- handle: 10670/1.fol52r
- hal: hal-02901398
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Goal-oriented agents incentives matching market D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D86 - Economics of Contract: TheorySujets proches
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Ines Macho-Stadler et al., « Goal-oriented agents in a market », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10670/1.fol52r
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Résumé
We consider a market where \standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goalorented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payo (the \trigger") to fulll a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments..