Intentionnalité et normativités pratiques : l’exemple du consentement

Résumé 0

Marie-Hélène Desmeules recalls how phenomenology, although being an essentially descriptive method, has from its beginnings tried to elucidate the normative aspects of our experience. According to the first phenomenologists, intentionality – a key notion of phenomenology – has been at the basis of many experiments with a normative content. However, by thinking of normativity in terms of the intentional structure, phenomenologists have often reduced the former to a form of theoretical normativity. In this paper, she aims to demonstrate that intentionality is still a relevant notion when it comes to thinking about the constitution of practical normativities that are irreducible to a form of theoretical normativity. I take the intentional act of consenting as a guiding example, and identify its specific practical normative effects by comparing it to the intentional acts of promising, accepting and approving, as described by Adolf Reinach and Edmund Husserl.