Referenda under Oath

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Date

8 juin 2010

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Périmètre
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INRAE

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info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess




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Nicolas Jacquemet et al., « Referenda under Oath », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10670/1.lg3jqm


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Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a design commonly promoted in nonmarket valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that people who sign an oath are as likely to vote for the public good (e.g., wind energy R&D) in a hypothetical referenda as in a real one. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab.

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