Rainwater harvesting and groundwater conservation : when endogenous heterogeneity matters

Fiche du document

Date

11 septembre 2014

Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Organisation

INRAE

Licence

info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess


Mots-clés

asymmetric equilibrium differential game groundwater rainwater


Citer ce document

Raphael Soubeyran et al., « Rainwater harvesting and groundwater conservation : when endogenous heterogeneity matters », Archive Ouverte d'INRAE, ID : 10670/1.mkyn64


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé En

In this paper, we focus on resource conservation in a model of decentralized management of groundwater and rainwater. We show that a conservation policy may have opposite effects on the level of the resource, depending on the outcome of the decentralized management. More precisely, we consider identical farmers who can use two water resources (groundwater and/or rainwater) and we study the symmetric and asymmetric feedback stationary Nash equilibria of the dynamic game. We show that a subsidy on the use of rainwater may increase the level of the aquifer at the symmetric equilibrium, whereas it decreases the level of the aquifer at the asymmetric equilibrium. This suggests that the usual focus on (interior) symmetric equilibria in dynamic games may provide misleading policy implications.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en